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individualistic spirit of nominalism ye t considered it es-
sential to embody in their organizations an authoritative 
II character vvhich rap idl~' assumed r elig ious significance to the 
members of the organization. This auth oritative tendency and 
its effects are still demarcating between one denomination and 
another. 
I The conflict between science and relig ion first began 
'I because of this authoritative character of' organized relig ion. 
Theologians throughout history have, in the main , g iven a 
literal interpretation of the Scriptures. St. !unbrose, St. 
Au gustine, Luther , Calvin, in fact, the major portion of the 
J' church leaders, accepted a literal transla tion of the Bible.l 
It wa s thi s beli ef that first brought the church into conflict 
1 with science when the astronomical conclusions of eop ernicus 
:i 
II II 
Jl 
were published in 1543. The church had long accepted the 
Ptolemaic doctrine which had been so well accepted by Aristotle I 
,: 
I 
I 
I 
II that the earth was the c enter of the universe . Copernicus , 
however , advanced the heliocentric theory that the sun was the 
cent er of the universe . It seemed inconceivable to him tha t 
all the rest of the universe revolved around t he earth within 
twenty-four hours. The Copernican theory is a much simpler 
method of explaining the fa c ts and enab l e s astronomers to pre-
1 
diet future occurrences and to calculate the positions of un-
II 
'I 
seen heavenly b odies. Thus, it superseded the Ptolemai c theory1 
I 
. I I 
1. See Wnite , WST, 25 ,26 • 
4 
Any astronomical observation that is made in the Bible, 
incidental or otherwise, is, of course, hased on the idea that 
t h e earth is the center of the universe. It was believed that 
the astronomical bodies were created for the purpose of guiding 
affairs on the earth which was conceived of as being flat. 
Thus, in the Bible the various writers speak of the "four 
corners of the earth," the "rising and setting" of the sun, 
and the sun and moon as "lights in the firmament." The heavens 
were conceived as being solidly built. Now, t h is, of course, 
was a very natural way for the Biblical writers to express 
themselves. Indeed, the p ersons for whom they innnedia.tely wrote 
would have been bewildered if they had spoken in any other 
fash ion. vVhen, however, t he church canonized these writings in 
the Bible and claimed that these words were directly inspired 
by God and to be accepted in a literal manner, it is obvious 
tha_t the publication of Copernicus' book , The Revolutions of 
the Celestial Orbs, was incompatible with what t he church 
taught. The church being in the . supremacy, it was natural that 
the wor1~ of Copernicus should be condenmed. In 1616 1 the Index 
reported., upon investigation, 
that t he doctrine t hat the sun was the centre 
of the world and immovable was false and absurd, 
formally heretical and contrary to Scripture, 
whereas the doctrine t hat the earth was not the 
centre of the world but moved, and has further 
a daily motion, was philosophically false and 
absurd and theologic& ly at least erroneous.2 
2. Berry, SHA, 159. 

































As long as the Bible was regarded as the infallible 
' Word of God', there were persons who, with more 
sense than s~rmpathy, scoffed at it because so 
many of its passages are ungodly . But the ground 
is taken from under the feet of scoffers when the 
human origin of the Bible is recognized; f or 
then its cruder passages are seen to be ohly .the 
inevitable imp erfections of struggling humanity, 
with wlliich we, still struggling to-day, must 
warmly s~npathize.lO 
There are some who argue that the Bible was infmlible 
in its original manuscript but that the copy of the copies of 
:I 
II 
ir 
I 
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., 
•I 
I 
I 
I 
the Bible that we h ave today contai nsmistakes, This argument, 11 
\I 
I 
II 
for all practical purposes, is worthless, however, because 
the original manuscripts of t he Bible are not ava i lable nor 
is there much hope tha t they ever wi l l be. The Bible, if it 
is to be used, must be servmceable in the form that it is; 
man must interpret it as best he can. 
As the theory of evolution has developed, it has had .two 
main tendencies in its teleolog ical aspects. In the first 
'I 
II 
\\ 
li 
jl 
II 
I' 
place, it has revealed increasing evidence of desi gn and purpo s el 
I 
I in nature and, in t he second place, parallel with its evidence 
of d esign, it has ac centua.red and brought into clear light 
the dysteleological f acts of nature. The latter tendency has 
brought the problem of evil into the fore in relig ious thought. 
In the light of the evolutionary theory, the scientist 
has looked at nature and increasingly found evidence of order, 
of des :gn ·, of purposive progression, of directing intelligence 
in nature. 
10. Davis, Art.(l9 34), 403. 
I 
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striving to overcoo1e for the realization of the greatest good 
possible. 
Other theistic writers have been forced to reckon more 
with the problem of evil due to the prominence which it has 
received as a result of evolution. T{iany maintain that evol-
ution must be mea sured by the outcome of its struggle and 
suffering. Viewed in this light, t hey maintain, the results 
of t h e evolutionary pDocess are not evidence of malevolence 
but, rather, of progress toward "that one f ar-off divine event 
toward which the whole creation moves.n24 This, however, does 
II 
il 
IJ 
'I I, 
I 
not explain the presence of evil as man looks upon evolutionary I 
development. 
In summary of the present status of the conflict between 
science and religion in connecti on with evolution, it can be 
said that, despite the inauspicious start which evolution 
received at the hands of theol ogians, it is now clearly recog-
nized that ~volution constitutes no barrier to religious 
belief. A catholic writer states this decisivily: 
On the hypothesis of human bodily evolution, 
God would have infused into some already existing 
living creature, presumably a being fairly man-
like in constitution and general a.pp earance, a 
rational, free, immortal soul. Our quest i on is 
this: If this hypothesis should some day be 
sc :tentif i cally demonstrs.t ed, would it be con-
trary to Catholic faith? Catholic theologians 
answer unanimously that it would not.25 
24. See Conklin, DHE, 240. 
25. Cooper, ROC, II, 35. The separation of the idea of 
t h e soul from that of the body is r eadi l y apparent in this 
quotation. For consideration of the relation b etween thesoul 
and the body see pag es 80- 84 . 
it 
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In many r espects the teleological evidence which 
!, 
evolution \' 
has produced has been ut i lized by theologians to furth er re-
veal the attributes of God, especially in regard t o His im-
manence in nature. Evolution has also forced theologians to 
consider more seriously the problem of evil in considering 
God and His relation to the universe. Changing concepts, of 
course, are only slowly apprehended, but t i me inexorabl y s i fts 
on i n its relentles s task of separating truth from error 
wh erein elusi ve truth will prevail. 
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From the religious point of view today, however, the entire 
universe and all the happe1.1ings wi t~:1 in 1 t are miracles in the 
sense t hat the irr ..manent and sustainingpower of God controls 
and directs the universe. "The present generation ha s become 
habituated to accepting the results of sc ientific d i s coveries. 
It has at the s ame time become increasingly incredu lous about 
miracles, which are now more and more overlooked, neglected, 
forgotten. 11 25 Another scientist st ates tha t 
miracles which were once supposed to prove the 
existence of the supernatural and the authen-
ticity of religion have become a source of doubt 
rathe r than of faith in this scientific age. 
Many theologians who have felt t h e spirit of 
science explain them as allegories or as nat·m"al 
phenomena. not understood by those who witnessed 
them. .And the consensus of intellig ent opinion 
throughout the world is t hEt if supernatural 
mir ;: cles were perfommed in former times, they 
do not oc cur toda·v. 26 
o) 
For t h ose religious groups who insist upon the deity of 
Christ, as the Catholics do, for example, the supreme miracle 
of God becomeing man and dy ing and! r i s i ng again assumes para-
mount importance and all other mir acles b ecome subservient to 
this supreme miracle. The question about other miracles then 
bec omes only an i nquiry as to whether the other events occurring 
in the acco~~t of the Bible actually occurred as miraculous 
hap penings or no t. If the evidence is considered suf~icient 
and t h e occas~on is deemed worthy of a miraculous happening , 
t h e r e is no difficuJ.ty in believing that a miracle occurred. 
25. Davis, Art.(l934), 405. 
26. Conklin, DHE, 200. 
65 
Miracles are conceived of not as interrupting or disrupting 
natural law but as transcending natural law for the furtherance 
of higher values .• 
Scientists, on the whole, are inclined to di s count the 
evidence for m:lracles but, in as much as they grant the possi-
bility of miracles as either i mplicit or explicit in their 
conception of God, they do not present any fundamental case 
for believing thst miracles may not h ave occurred in the past 
or do not occur to day in answer to prayer. Thus, the authori-
tarinns who believe that miracles are involved in the spe~mal 
revelation of God, although they ha ve received caution from 
sci ence to examine the evidence and the re asons for minncles 
more carefully, do not find any rea l barrier for not bel :i.eving 
in miracles from science. Carrel readily admits the occurrence 
of mira cle s today althcu gh this occurrence is rare. 
Miraculous cures seldom occur. Despite their 
small number, they prove the existence of or-
ganic and mental processes that we do not know. 
They show that certain mystic stat es, such as 
that of prayer, have definite effects. They 
are stubborn, irreducible facts, which must be 
taken into account.27 
In conclusion, then, relig ion stands in ppen opposition 
and conflict with t hose who would construe the universe a s 
a naturalistic self-suffici ent and s elf-explanatory system. 
For tho se wh o uphold religious revelation as a purely person-
al and subjective matter, sciance cannot conflict due to t he 
very na1ur·e of the r evelation that is maintamned. For a 
27. Carrel, MU, 148n. 
66 
revelation that is based on an exp eriential basis, either as 
part or as a whole of e1~ er i ence, there is very little con-
f lict. The only opposition from the scientific tenor of the 
present day comes from those who would assert that only by the 
strict method of the natural sciences can any knowledge come 
to man. This n ~:unber, however, i s meeting strong opposition 
from among the foremost men of s cience today . For those who 
uphold s ome form of authoritative or historical :eevelation 
with its miraculous element usually a ccompanying, scientific 
men h ave become rather incredulous but, in as much a s they 
admit any supernatural belief, no fundamental issue is pre-
sented. The conflict in t h is case revolves around the inter-
pretation of t he r evelation which the religious group pro-
fes s es to be au thoritative. 
67 


faith will be consecutively considered. 
Psycholo gy because of the very nature of its subject 
matter--the mind of man--has come closer to the realm of the 
relieious experiences of man than the other sciences. As a 
science, however, psychology as yet is in only an embryonic 
stage when its history is compared, for example, with that of 
physics. 
Pundamental psychological questions quicldy 
take us into regions of philosophical unc er-
tai nty, and it is more difficult than in other 
sciances to avoid fun damental questions, because 
of the paucity of exact experimenta knowledge.2 
Nevertheless, the metaphysical conclusions which psychology 
has led to in regard to the soul, consciousness, personality, 
freedom, and immortality have vitally affected relig imus con-
victions. From psychological investigat i ons men with a materi-
alistic viewpoint such as Russell have challenged the assertions 
of many relig ious beliefs and the philosophical foundations upon 
wh ich they have been erected. 
Psychology, in as much as it has developed from t h e other 
scinces, has adopted the orderly s equence of nature as one of 
its articles of f aith and, upon this basis, has sought to inter-
pret the p sychical life of man. In this manner it has attempted 
to interpret all the various mental phenomena in a deterministic 
manner and the result of this application of determinism to the 
spheres of the thought-lif e of man has been the development of 
a material is tic viewpoint concerning the mental processes. 
2. Russell, RS, 110. 
70 
Memory, perception, the distinctiveness of the self, and 
t h e personality of man have been interpre t ed by psychology in 
a s t rictly deterministic manner. Psychologists have sougp.t 
to explai n mental processes in terms of physical and cl~emical 
phenomena. Typical of this attempt by psy-yhology to reduce 
p sychological phenomena to material concepts is the explanation 
of memory in an elementary analogy offered by Russell: 
Memor y , it may be said, is something distinc-
tively ' mental,' but this agal n may be denied. 
Memory is a for.m of habit, and habit is charac-
teristic of nervous tissue , thuugh it may occur 
elsewhere, for example :i.n a roll of pap er which 
rolls it s elf up again if it is unwound . I do 
not su~~est that the above is a complete anal y sis 
of what we vaguely call 'consciousness'; b the 
question is a l arge one , and woul d requ ire a 
volume .3 
Against this materialistic interpretation of ps ychology 
there has arisen not only conflict with religious beliefs but 
conflict from sciehtifi c men themselves as t o the applica tion 
of the deterministic method of t he natural sciences to the 
realm of psychical phenomena. The disparity between mind and 
body , between conscious life and unconscious mat ter has brought 
opposition to the d eterministic character of p sychological 
i nvestig e. t i on. 
In the f irst pl a ce, this application of' the deterministic 
method of the natural scienc es to psychi cal phenomena h as 
probably done more to convince men of the f a ct that science is 
deterministic only in its restricted universe of discourse 
3. Russell, RS , 132. 
'71 
than any remonstration of religious leaders ever could have 
done. K8hler says that the application of the principles of 
evolution to the mental life of man is an example of "the 
most curlous and the most dangerous instance of Nothing But."4 
Haldane asserts that "for biology physical interpretation is 
only partial and imperfect interpretation."5 Dampi er shows 
how 
philosophers came to understand that science 
could only disclose certa i n .aspects of reality, 
could only draw plane diagrams, sketches for a 
model of nature, and tha t it was by its own 
definitions, axioms and underlying assumptions 
that science was neces sari ly mechanic al and 
deterministic.6 
Barnes states that "the belief tha t thought is a sort of by-
product of material changes t hat truce place in the brain, and 
that all such change s are part of a vast mechanism, s eems to 
me l udicrous. 11 7 These statements show how scientists are in-
creasingl y realizing that the n a tur al sciences can only be 
deterministic in the limited field to which they restrict 
themselves. The re action against a deterministicexplanation 
of psychologycal phenomena has, in t h is same line of thou ght, 
been opposed on the idea t hat a deterministmc method is in-
applicable to many psychic phenomena. 
In the second place, partly derivative from the growing 
realization tha t the deterministic met hod of science is only 
a partial outlook upon the universe, has c ome the concept of 
4. K8hler, PmVF, 25. 
5. Haldane~, Art .(l931), 42. 
6. Dampier, HS, 484,485. 
7. Barnes, Art.(l931) 60 . 
'72 
organicism of which \~1itehead is the able exp onent. 
Abstractions are necessary for analysis, but 
they involve the ignoring of the rest of nature 
and of exp erience, from which the abstrctions 
are made. Thus they give an incomplete picture 
even of science, arld a still more incomplete 
one of the whole of existence. The doctrine 
of determi nistic mechanism only applies to very 
abstract entities, the product of logic~ anal-
ysis. The concrete enduring entities of the 
world are complete organisn;. s, so that the 
stru~ ture of the whole influences the charac-
ter of the parts. An atom may behave differently 
when it forms part of a man; its conditions 
are determined by the nature of the man as an 
organism. £Aental states enter into the struc-
ture of the total organism, and thus modify the 
plans of the subordinate parts right down to the 
electrons. An electron blindly runs, but within 
the body it blindly runs a s conditioned by the 
~hole ~lan of the body, including the mental 
state.B 
In t his manner, the analysis of the psychological determinists 
have been looked at from the viewpoint of t h e whole and been 
seen to be only an incomplete picture of the total organism 
which is man. 
In the third place, the advent of a materialistic ex-
planation of mental processes and the elements of indeter-
m:Lnacy introduced i nt o the new physics has increasiggly pro-
mulgated the explanation of the universe in terms of mental 
processes rather than in terms of a materialistic atomism or 
sensationalism. Although an explanation of the universe as 
mental or spiritual in na ture does not invalidate a materialis-
tic conception of the universe (the "material" o.f the universe 
t h en can become mental or spiritual), it does alter t he 
8. Dampier, HS, 4~8,479. 
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In these tendencies to look upon the uni verse as essenti-
ally explicable i n terr.Jls of subj ecti vi t y·, of eonsciousness, of 
en ergy , or of mind, the metaphysical conclusi ons drawn from 
scientific invest igation, especially in the psychological 
real m due to the i mpetus from psycholog ical investigation, 
have become increasingly amenable to a t heistic interpretation 
of the universe. In t h is vein of thought Morgan states that 
the ascent of min<il -"may be regarded as a manif estEtion or 
revelation of a Supreme Mind, conceived as the Creator of 
all t hat we E;. re 1 ed to interpret as new. ull Dampier is led 
to assert that 
possibly the present difficulties will be over-
come, and physicis t s fonnula te a new atomic model 
which for a time will satisfy our minds. But, 
now or later, intelligible mechanism will fail, 
and we shall be left face to face *ith the awful 
mystery which is reality .l2 
Thus, in many aspects, the explanat i on of the universe in 
terms of mental, nonmaterial phenomena he.s been of definite 
const r uctive i nfluence in the formulation of the conception 
of the universe a s the ever-pi•esent and constant manifes-
tation of the purpose of God. 
In the fourth place, psychological investigation h as 
brought to the fore questions concerning the fr e edom of man. 
The concept of t·reedom has accupied an interesting religious 
position vary ing fl ... om the denial of all freedom to man in the 
theological d etermin~sm of Calvi.n to the emphasis upon the 
11. Morgan, Art.(l934), 124. 
12. Dampier, HS, 492. 
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freedom and responsibility of man in the Arminian system. 
That the idea of freedom has come into conflict with 
scientific psychological investigation is 8pparent when it is 
considered thEt one of the main tasks of science is to de-
termine and understand the causal sequences of pl:Umomena whether 
they be considered as mental or material. In its maintenance 
upon the freedom of the individual, relgion has thus set forth 
a sphere of the mental activity of man which is inaccessible 
to science. "If there is any region where there are no causal 
laws, that region is inaccessible to science. ffl3 In its em-
phasis upon the freedom of the human will many religious groups 
h a.ve declared any fOl"lnulation of that realm by science !:a a 
strictly causal manner as impossible. 
'J:hat psychology h a s attempted to give a causal explanation 
pf many 1B.lll11tal phenomena is reB.dily apparent when Russell makes 
the statement that 
psychology and physiology, in so far as they 
bear upon the question of free will, tend to 
make it improbable. 1!.'ork on internal secretions, 
increa sed knowledge of the functi ons of different 
parts of the brain, Pavlovfs i nvestigation of 
c cnditio:aed reflexes, and the psycho-analytic 
study of the effects of repressed memories and 
desires, ha ve all contributed to the discovery 
of causal laws governing mental phenomena. 
1Jone ofthem, of course, have disproved the 
possibility of free will, but they have made 
it highly probabl~ that, if uncaused volitions 
do ever occur, they are very r are.l4 
In contradiction to statements of this sort drm•n from the 
13. Russell, RS, 147. 
14. Russell, RS, 163. 
76 
work of psychology, other scj_entists and philosophers have 
dra'\lvn conclusions diametrically opposed. Re cent physics, fs.r 
as it may at first seem from the re 2~m of p sychology, in its 
assertion as to only the probability of prediction concerning 
large aggregates and the indeterminacy of the individual elec-
trons, h as affected p sychology in as much as psychology a ttempts 
to explain consciousness as determined mechanically according 
to the laws of physics and chemistry . Eddingt on says: 
In the discussion of free·will provdllied by the 
modern physical theories, it ha s, I think, 
generally been assumed that, since the ordin-
ary laws of inorganic matterleave its behaviour 
undeterrained within a c ertain narrow range, there 
can be no scientific object i on to allowing a 
volition of consciousnes to decide t h e exact 
behaviour wi thi n the linli ts . of the aforesaid 
range.l5 
If the conclusions of men lik e Eddingt on and J eans are accepted 
in regard to the indeterminacy of modern physics, psychology, 
in as much as it has attempted to b ecome mehhanistic by ex -
plaL~ing mental phenomena in terms of physical laws, ca~~ot 
maintain its deterministic position. 
Brown asserts t h at psychology can only be me chanis tic 
because it is alway s dealing with pre sent events in t emms of 
p ast events which do ·~ S not really destroy any fre edom in the 
inn11ediate instance. 
Some psychologists may think that determinism 
is on the road to being proved tt~ough the fur-
t h er development of psychology. That, of course, 
is re asoning in a circle, because what we do in 
psychology is to look for caus .:;; s of the various 
15. Eddington, PPS, 182. 
effects that we see, on the basis of the postu-
late of determinism . In philosophy there is the 
fund~1ental principle of sufficient reason 
(Leibnitz), the pr:i.nciple that there is always 
a sufficient r ea son why anything should happen 
r e. ther than not haP ':. en. Det erminism looks for 
the sufficient reason i n any particular case 
8 lways in what has already occurred. We there-
fore know beforehand , however rapidly deep 
analysis may develop--and it i s developing 
rapidly every year now--we know beforehand 
that it will seem to restrict ever more and more 
the doctrine of the freedom of the will. The 
further psychology advances, the less will the 
idea of freedom, or of spontaneity of the mind, 
be ap!Jarent . But the very fac t tha t vve can pre-
dict this shows that it is not the r bsult of 
psycholog ical ad -,_ranee. Psy chology cannot either 
prove or disprove deterrninism.l6 
11ather is g e t t i ng at this same idea when he says tha t "environ-
ment can not a.tthe same time offer opportunities for choice 
and determine which opportunityshall bechosen. 11 17 
The effect that the denial of freedom to man by p sychology 
would have upon religious beliefs is difficult to estima te. 
The Calvinis ts, of course, in their emphasis upon the sovereign· 
ty of God have asserted tha t man is determined and has no fr e e-
dom of hiw own. This has been called t heological determinism . 
Theological determinists assert that everything is determined 
b y God whereas n a.turalistic d etermi nis t s maintai n that ns ture 
is a self-suffici ent and mechanically determined system which 
has no need tlf eithe-r an iw.manent or a transcendent God. . Theo-
logical determi nism must not be c onfused with naturalistic 
determinism. 
16. Brown, Art.(1925), 318. 
17. Mather, SSG, 98. 
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The , Armi nians, in opposition to the Calvinists, have 
insisted strongly upon the freedoom and i ndividual responsi-
bility of man. The freedom of man has occupied en important 
pla ce in their theological system and the denial of any free-
dom to ma..'1 woul d necessitate a great d eal of change of thou~ht. · 
Particularly is t his important in t heir reconcili a.tion of error 
and truth.l8 It may be possible t hat for t h e complete develop-
ment of a system of full-orbed truth elements of both det ermin-
ism and freedom are necese e.ry. Dampier seems to intimate this 
at times: 
It must not be forgotten that, for effective 
freedom af will, nature must be orderly. No 
condition is so servile as tha.t of him who is 
subject to a capricious and incalculable tyrant. 
To be ma s tersof our lives, 'Ne must b e able to 
ste er our cour se over well-charted seas, as 
well as have power to control the rudder. 
According to pre s ent k:nowledge, mank ind may 
b e sta-ttistically the sls.ves of fa te, bu t for 
the individualthhe mechanism to which he is 
subject may be orderly though determinable, 
and there may still be room for fr eedom.l9 
lfan as fr e e and man as determi ned maybe different aspects of 
regarding the basic truth of man in relation to the universe. 
Th is discus s ion n aturally involves the problem of the 
relation between mind and body , between the Jtmntal series and 
the thing series. The theories of mater1 alisn.!., parallelism, 
and int eractionism in their various :florras have all been ad-
vanced as theorie s to account for the relation betwe en mind 
18. See IDnudson, PP, 148-152. 
19. Dampier, HS, 4?4. 
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and body. In all of these theories is involved a distinct 
conception of consci cusness or mental activity. 
On the whole ,. materialisr.o1 has had to deny that cons cious-
ne s s is any unique process which cannot be explained in terms 
of physical conc ep ts. Parallelism has assert ed t ha t there is 
adist inct realm of things and of conscious precesses neither 
of which affectst he other but t hat e a ch occurs s imultaneously 
in a parallel series. Interactionm~m has maintro. n ed tha t 
both mirld and body exist and that e ach influences the other.20 
Of these theries, ma terlalism has been most antithetical to 
religion in the.t it ha s denied to consciousness any unique 
char .s.c ter ist ic upon which a re sl. igious system could be built. 
Paralleli sm ha s n ot had much vogue because its dualistic inter,;,. 
pret a tion of reality has not offered any b eneficial expl anat ion 
of t he r elation betwwen mind and body . I nt eractionism has, 
however, been utilizedby relig iou s l eader s to formulate a t 
the~stic monism in which the evidentfacts of interaction be-
tween mind and body are a ccepted and then explained by attrj_b-
uting the harmony and orderly relationship which exists be-
tween them as due to the creation and guidance of a uni tary 
Be:l.ng , God. Haldane, speaking with referen ce to s cienc e as 
a whole, 111Skes a statement that can r eadily be applied to 
p sy chology in r 0.spect to its con e luslons conc erning the r e-
lation between mind and body which have been antithetical to 
t h i s religiou s a s sertion: 
20. See Brlghtman, ITP, 201-207. 
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of man and his relation to God. Too often, however, religious 
leaders have emphasized faith without bringing to the fore the 
fact that all fa j th must have a reas onalblbe foundat ion. Faith 
is not antithetical to reason; rather, rea s cn and faith sup-
plement each other in a valid relig ious system. 
In view of the faith of both science and relision,then, 
it can not legitima tely beeasserted t ha t science ha s a prior 
claim to knowledge whereas religion ca~Dot be regarded as 
knowledge. Both r <:; st on faith and neither can lay claim tJo 
philosophical certainty. "In t h e last anal\•sis science and 
.. ' 
.,....J . ell" g·l· on both r F: s t on faith.n32 Further nl· n an ag e of reason 
- . ' < -, 
fa i th yet remains supreme; f or reason is one of the articles 
of .faith.u33 
In summary, the attempt of psychology to explain all 
mental whenonema in a deterministic manner has led to four 
ma i n rea ctions: the r ecognition that scinnce can be determin-
istic only in its mm field of limitation, t h e growth of organ-
icism, the conception of metaphys i cal reality as rr: ental, and 
t h e continued insis t ence by religiou s gr oups with confirmation 
from scientific eire les of the freedom of man. I neeractionmmm 
as e:;;:p l anatory of the relation between mind and body has aided 
in the formuiliation of theistic monism. Religi ous belief h a s 
encountered no con.ffincing oppositi on in regard to t h e con -
ception of the self as u..Di tary and as more than a mere matter 
32.Mather, SSG, 132. 
33.Eddington, PPS, 222. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PROBLEMS OF VALUE 
The questions concerning value--the supreme value, the 
criterion of value, the reality of value, the ep istemological 
position of value--have been considered by the major philos-
ophers throu8hout history and have particularly gained attentior 
in recent years as the world has witness ed w~rs, abuse of 
knovvledge, disregard for personality, and skepticism concern-
ing the place of religion in life. These considerations have 
not been without their scientific and religious relations, for 
the answer to the que s tions concerning value are of paramount 
importance to religion and of great significance to the future 
development and use of science. 
It might be thought at first that science has nothing to 
do with value for a value, as such, cannot be taken into a 
laboratory and be graphed, measured, or quantitized in any 
manner. A value is not a physical thing . It may be partly 
because science has i gnored the idea of value and thought that 
it could proceed without taking into account the significance 
and uses of the advanc es which it has made tha t the present 
political, social, and economic upheavals have arisen. 
Improved machinery has thrown thousands of men out of 
employ:me:nt and created vast economic and social problems; 
advanced technique in the control of natural forces has made 
it possible for men to devise anduse weapons of war more deadly 






values , it can easily be seen that religion, in its recognition 
of value, contributes something to the total philosophy of 
man that science caru1.ot produce due to the very nature of its 
method . Streeter maintains t hat the apprehension of quality 
is something that is fundamental to relig ion and art and 
which cannot be adequately recognized by science with its 
emphasis upon quantity and accurately measurable elements 
of experience. 
Quality is something of which t h e apprehension 
is fundamental to life. If, then, t he 'stuff' 
of which Reality is made is in any way akin to 
life or mind , quality is as funda.l'!lental in it 
as quantity; value is as real as measurement. 
But apprehension of quality , ii' it is to pass 
from one man to another, must find a method of 
expression.lO 
For Streeter this meth od of expression consists in r elig ion 
and art. }.!lather says about the same t hing when he says t hat . 
11 to explain humanity at its b est, the evolutionist must as -
cribe t o the universe t hose qualities which we do well to 
call divine . nll 
The fa ct that it is in t his realm of value that religion 
ass1.unes a dominant position over science has been reit erated 
often. Religj_on has alway s b een concerned with the creation 
and preservation of values about which science has done noth-
ing but, without whi ch , science coul d n ot exist. 11 Science 
descr ibes t he event, relates h ow it occurred, sugGests i ts 
possible significance; but religion must determine its 
10. Streeter, Art. (1931), 101. 
11. Mather, SSG, 68. 
96 
I! 
II 
I 
I 
------ -------· 
II value. ttl2 Brightman states: 
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1/ The desire t o f ind God is deeper than the desire 
1 to attain any purely theoretical attitude toward 
; truth . Religion is more f"Lmdamental to life t han 
I is science. Scien ce gives us the fa cts of experi-
ll ence , and relig ion appraises t h eir ultimate value. 
Science g ives us the necessary laws of nature, but 
1
1 reli c, ion seeks for a cause that is wor t h living 
and dying for. Sc ience g ive s us instruments and I mean s, while r eligion g ives us ends and ideals. 
/ The search for God is a senrch f or the purpose of 
I l i fe and for an unfailing source of eternal value .l3 
I 
i 
' 
I 
Thus , the values of relig ion in the form of a sense of depen-
d ence on God and a confidence in the moral values of t h e 
univers e occupy a position of p reeminent imp ortance over the 
predominant descriptive nature of science. 
Agains t t he idea that science is t h e only method of a t-
taining knowledg e, Streeter p oint s out that although science 
attem.p ts to deal in quantitative t erms as much as possible, 
it is unable to do t r: is ent ire l y b ecause it must select the 
facts whi ch are pertinent to its field and the mind of t h e indil 
vidual expel,imenter cann ot be dispensed wi th as of being of 
non-effect in scientific investigation.l4 Thus , a strict ;· 
line of demarcation cann ot be drawn between knowledg e gained 
b~r science and knowledg e galned by r e lig ion and art conc erning 
the ultimate nature of the world. Sci entists recognize the 
inadequacy of t he scientific me t h od when man seek s an explan-
j ation of reality as a whole with which relig ion is concerned. 
i! 
II 
12. Mather , SSG, 118. 
13. Brightman , FG , 23 . 
14. See Streeter, Art.(l931), 100-102. 
II --::- ::=:-=:::=-..::=:=:..:. ==--=--=-:-= .:-=-=:.::-:.=:::=--=. :...-:.=--= ---=-----:===...._-==-_:-_-1 ===-
! 
f 
II 
I 
I 
_I 
Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of 
nature. And that is because, in the last anal-
ysis, we ourselves are part of nature and there-
fore part of the mystery that we are try ing to 
solve. Music .and art are, to an extent, also 
attempts to solve or a t least to express the 
mystery. But to my mind the more we progress 
with either the more we are brought i nto harmony 
with all nature itself.l5 
Eddington definitely expresses the fact that the method 
of physical science is not adequate to give the assurance and 
knowledge concerning the religious conv:ktions that man de-
sires. The application of the scientific met hod to religious 
experience leaves out the essential elements ~f the religious 
experience so that the factors that remain after scientific 
analysis only partially andinadequately express or exp lain 
the r eligi ous experience. 
The f ear is that when we come to analyse that 
which we call religi ous exp erience, we shall 
find t hat the God apparently revealed in it is 
merely a personificat i on of certain abstract 
principles. Now I fran.'Lcly admit t hat the ap-
plication of any method which we should call 
scientific to the exami nation of our religious 
experience is J..ikely to work t h is k ind of 
havoc,l6 
The concept of value is closely link ed with the field 
of the. normative sciences. The Encyclopedia Americana gives 
the following definition of no:bmative sciences: 
Normative sciences are sys t ems of propos:ttions 
whose cont ents are not flacts, but nor:mm; not 
experiences but values, and whose teaching is, 
therefore, not that something is, but that 
something ought to be. There l s thus a possible 
place for logic, ethics and aesthetics; for 
philosophy of law and religion.l7 
15. Planck , WSG, 217. 
16. Eddington, Art.(l931),,128. 
1'7 },1-l§nQT.Al'>hAY>O' liY>f: (10001 L!1~ 
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Religion as a normative science is considered as consistent 
and coherent interpretation of the religious exp eriences of 
ma1ikind in order to determine standards for religious advance. 
Normative sciences are based on the results of the descriptive 
sciences in pointing the way in which man should go. "Norma-
t i ve science rests on de scriptive science for its facts. 1118 
In the relationship which the normative sciences bear 
to the descriptive sciences can be seen a little of what the 
conflict between the value idea of rel i gion and the claim of 
science as the only me thod of obtaining truth has revolved 
around. The following quotation by a phwsicist shows a few 
of the implications of this relationship. 
I believe in God, not because physics provides 
an argument in favour of the existence of a 
Dei t y , but becaus e the fact tha t I am a physicist 
ddes not prevent my making observations in this 
other world of values, where sense-perceptions and 
pointer-readings are not our means ~B obtaining 
laLowledge. On the othe r hand it cannot be denied 
that t he chang ed outlook in physics has made it 
eas i er to believe in an uns een world. The attempt 
of the physicist to explain a world he can touch 
has led him to the view that its nature carmot 
be described in terms of t he concrete. He is more 
r eady to aclmit that there are more thing s i n 
heaven and earth t han are dr eamt of in his Phil-
osophy.l9 -
The relation of eth ics to sci ence and relig ion in its 
t heoretical aspects shows the manner in which religion supep-
sedes science in the realm of values. Science as such has 
little to do with moral values. 
18 . Brightman, ML, 57. 
19 . Robertson, Art.(l933), 57. 
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As to sci entific r esearch and the moral life, 
there is very little to say about that; except 
as far as every- day co~non acts are concerned, 
like veracity, diligence, the life of a scientist 
doe s not affect t h e moral life at all. It has 
no dangers , much less than are involved in re-
search in history or literature or the social 
sciences. The scientist has not to deal with 
values ~ has not to judge soc i al or moral ques-
tions.GO 
Religion, on the other hand, has always been intimat ely 
associ a ted with the moral lif e of man. Kant, in fact, made 
morals the b asis of relig ion and p r actically equated the moral 
imperative with religion. Philosoph i es of religion mak e the 
essence of God goodness. 
It must not be thought that in the f a ct tha t ethics is 
a normative science and i n that resp ect goes beyond the realm 
of science that it therefore becomes of less cognitive value. 
Bright:man say s i n the prefa ce to his h~o ral Laws: "Horal Laws 
has been written with the convict i on that ethics is truly a 
science; not , indeed , a natural science or a merely descrip-
tive one, but a normative science of ideal principles.rr21 
Y/i th t his approa ch the validity of c; thics does not rest upon 
an authoritative statement of credal r e ligion. Ra ther, the 
validity of ethics s t ands in its own right just a s any of the 
n atural sci ences does . 
The f act that the validity of ethics remains irresp ective 
of its relig ious atta chments does not mean , however , that 
et hics is not truly a relig ious value. A psychologist states: 
20. Herzfeld, Art .{l933), 433. 
21. Brightman, ML, 9. 
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It is true that religious experience has been 
specially closely associated wi th ethical ex-
perience in the course of mental development 
i n the individual as well as in the r ace; forms 
of wor sh i p and religious appreciation h ave b een 
link ed up more and more closely with moralvalu-
at :Lons, so t hat in the higher relig ions it is 
impossible to think away moral predicat es f rom 
the conception of the divine.22 
In summar y , t h e problem of values has been considered 
f rom t he viewpoint of science and religion. From t h e view-
point of science it has been pointed ou t tha t sci ence, as sucl~ , 
has limited itself s o tha t the field of valu es i s without its 
field. This doe s not give to science, however, any greater 
cla im to knowl ed:::,e than t hat knowledge which is rea ch ed through 
an exami na tion of the problem of values. Further, scienoific 
knowledc e, i f it is to continu e to pregress, must be paralleled 
wi th a corresponding increase in religi ou s and ethical val u e s. 
From t he religi ous point of vi ew, it has been seen how re-
ligi on concer ns its el f more wit h qualitative differ ences t h an 
sci ence can du e to its very me t hod . The rel igiou s val ue s con-
stitue an il1portant p l a ce in life and must be considered if 
one is to pres ent an adequate philosophy of relig ion wh ich 
fo rmuih.ate s a coherent and complete view of the universe. The se 
rel :ationehips which sc i ence and religion b ear to e a ch oth er in 
regar d to the problem of values was s hown in the sphere of 
t he normative sciences and, particularly, in t h e field of 
eth ics. 
22. Brown, Art.(l925), 305. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Sill\1Nif.I..RY AND COlWLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the grounds for conflict between science 
and religion that were mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter 
Two can be considered in retrospect. There it wasshown that 
one of the major points of conflict between science and re-
ligion has evolved when religion has been cons idered auth ori-
tative. Conflict has arisen when science has shown t hat this 
authority or parts of i t have not ·been confi rmed or substanti-
ated either by evidence or in experience. The extent of the 
scient i fic refut at i on of e.uthority in religion has varied con-
siderably according to the manner in which the authority has 
been conceived. 
The conflict in regard to authority was n~ei nly dealt w:i.th 
in the discussion on evolution. The majority of the historical 
conflicts such as those centering around the Copernican theory 
and the t heory of evolution have been caused by the opp osing 
claims of· science and religl on. Today the conf lict has assumed 
three definite forms: t he cla ims advanced in support of the 
scientific theories are considered untenable; the aut hority 
of the relig ious group in regard to the scientif i c t heory under 
d i scussion is rejected ; or, the claims of the r e l igious group 
and the scientifi c theory a r e shown to be mutually compatible. 
This h as usually invol vecl a reinterpretation of the authori ta.-
tive s ource o~ t he part of the rel i g i ous group . 


than it was when Newtonian physics was considered final. 
In the reaLm of psychology it has been fourld that, al thru gh 
some have constru ed a deterministic system of metaphysics from 
the conclusions of psychology, there has been opposition to 
this i'rom the scientists in many wa;{s. Science recognizes 
that it must maintamn the freedom of man and t he unity of 
personality as a basis for science its~~f. Otherwise , there 
is no distinction between truth and error or between knowledge 
and lack of knowledge . 
Opposition between science and rel igion has arisen when 
assertions have been made that only by the method of science 
can any knowledg e be gained. In as much asth is has invalidated 
the religious knowledge of man, religion has been unable to 
recognize t h is viewpoint. · Religious leaders have poi nted out 
that in the ultimate analysis science res t s on fai t h as well 
as religion. Further, in as much as science, by its very 
method , cannot cope with the questions of value rel igbus 
xnowledge in th5_s field supersedes s cientific knowledge. 
Science has come more and mor e to realize tha t it cannot 
advance without a cori'esponding advance in t h e ethi c al and 
relig i ous nature of man . For this reason the problem of 
value has assun1ed grea t importance and has convinced men of 
the fact that in order to give a coherent a ccount of the uni-
verse and formulate an adequate philosophy of relig i on, the 
values andinterests of man must receive consideration. In this 
resp ect the normative sciences and t heir claim to pres ent valid 
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